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THE MARKET FOR ODIOUS DEBT 
CAROLINE M. GENTILE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
For over one hundred years, political leaders, financiers, lawyers, and 
scholars in the fields of international law and international finance have 
struggled to develop an effective means for sovereign debtors to repudiate their 
odious debts. Despite their efforts, these debts—incurred by a dictatorial 
regime for its own benefit with the knowledge of the creditors, but without the 
consent of the nation’s citizens—are transferred to new governments. As a 
result, the citizenry suffers two harms: the first under the dictator’s brutal rule, 
and the second under the new government’s severe macroeconomic policies 
engendered by the need to repay the debts the dictator incurred to finance his 
reign. 
The resurgence of efforts to incorporate a concept of illegitimacy into 
sovereign debt restructurings is one of the most salient developments in the 
modern legal history of sovereign debt. In a few instances, governments have 
claimed that the country’s existing debt is unlawful and so need not be repaid. 
For example, Rafael Correa, the President of Ecuador, established the Public 
Debt Audit Commission in July of 2007 to investigate the legitimacy of the 
debts the country incurred during the thirty-year period from 1976 through 
2006.1 The Commission issued its report in November of 2008, concluding that 
two series of bonds issued in 2000,2 the global bonds maturing in 2012 and the 
global bonds maturing in 2030, were unlawful.3 The Commission thus 
recommended that Ecuador refuse to make payments on these bonds.4 The next 
month, Mr. Correa denounced these bonds as “illegitimate,” reportedly arguing 
that “they were improperly authorised by previous administrations and 
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 1. Wade Mansell & Karen Openshaw, Suturing the Open Veins of Ecuador: Debt, Default and 
Democracy, 2 L. & DEV. REV. 151, 153 (2009). 
 2. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Coroner’s Inquest, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 2009, at 22, 
23 [hereinafter Coroner’s Inquest]. 
 3. Mansell & Openshaw, supra note 1, at 168. 
 4. Naomi Mapstone & David Oakley, Ecuador Hints at Default over “Illegitimate” Debt, FIN. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at 26. 
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involved onerous interest rates, commissions and prepayments.”5 On April 20, 
2009, Ecuador completed a restructuring of these bonds, repurchasing them at a 
price of thirty-five cents on the dollar.6 
Yet, governments are reluctant to invoke the doctrine of odious debt.7 
Moreover, upon invoking the doctrine, governments are hesitant to pursue 
application of the doctrine.8 While the subject of intense debate in the political 
sphere and the academy, the doctrine of odious debt has never been used in an 
international tribunal.9 To invoke it in support of the repudiation of sovereign 
debts would, in the absence of acquiescence from creditors, expose a new 
government to severely negative economic consequences. Assets located 
outside the country’s borders could be seized as payments on the debts. The 
new government would be seen as repudiating valid debts and so would be 
unlikely to attract needed direct foreign investments or to secure needed 
extensions of credit. 
Thus, the bulk of the recent work concerning the doctrine of odious debt has 
been devoted to adapting the doctrine to serve as a means of constraining the 
incentives of creditors to make loans to dictators. For example, scholars have 
proposed assigning the responsibility of determining which regimes (not debts) 
are odious to an international authoritative body.10 Upon the designation of a 
regime as odious, creditors would be apprised that any loans made to the 
regime would be illegitimate and so nontransferable to a new government. The 
reduction in the likelihood of repayment would curtail the benefits of extending 
credit to the regime, making creditors less willing to do so. 
Other scholars have worked to develop mechanisms for declaring sovereign 
debts to be odious and thus unenforceable while the dictatorial regime is in 
power, rather than upon the regime’s overthrow and the emergence of a new 
government. These tools include charging an international tribunal, upon the 
petition of enumerated parties, with the enforcement of the core principles of 
the doctrine11 and embedding specified elements of the doctrine into the 
 
 5. Naomi Mapstone, Ecuador Maintains Bond Default Threat, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008 (on file 
with author). 
 6. Coroner’s Inquest, supra note 2, at 25; Mansell & Openshaw, supra note 1, at 177–78. 
 7. The new democratic government of South Africa, for example, continues to service the debt 
incurred under the Apartheid Regime. See Joseph Hanlon, Defining “Illegitimate Debt”: When 
Creditors Should Be Liable for Improper Loans, in SOVEREIGN DEBT AT THE CROSSROADS 109, 121–
23 (Chris Jochnick & Fraser A. Preston eds., 2006). 
 8. President Correa has refrained from repudiating the sovereign bonds he regards as illegitimate, 
preferring to use references to the odious debt doctrine as a tool in restructuring the global bonds. See 
Mansell & Openshaw, supra note 1, at 180–81. 
 9. Andrew Yianni & David Tinkler, Is There a Recognized Legal Doctrine of Odious Debts?, 32 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 749 (2006) (arguing that a legal doctrine of odious debt does not exist). 
 10. See generally Patrick Bolton & David Skeel, Odious Debts or Odious Regimes?, 70 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Autumn 2007); Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious Debt, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 82 (2006). 
 11. Christoph G. Paulus, “Odious Debt” vs. Debt Trap: A Realistic Help?, 31 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
83, 101–02 (2005). 
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contracts governing loans to sovereigns, thereby placing the responsibility for 
identifying odious debts on creditors.12 The risk that a sovereign debt may be 
determined to be odious, and therefore subject to repudiation, increases the 
costs of extending credit to dictators, accordingly reducing the likelihood that 
creditors will make loans to despotic rulers. 
Finally, many scholars have investigated the applicability of principles of 
private (domestic) law to sovereign debts. In particular, they examine the extent 
to which common-law principles of contract, tort, and lender liability—as well 
as fundamental principles of insolvency—might provide an effective defense for 
a new government that is sued for failure to make payments on an odious debt 
incurred during the prior reign of a despot.13 The greater expenses of lending 
created by the risk that a new government might successfully repudiate the 
debts of a deposed dictator limit the incentives of creditors to make loans to 
despots. 
Each of these proposals, however, lacks a consideration of the structural 
features of the international financial architecture. The failure to consider the 
various types of creditors—governments, international financial institutions, 
and private lenders, comprising both commercial banks and holders of 
sovereign bonds—and the conditions under which each of these entities makes 
and enforces loans to sovereign debtors, limits the applicability of the proposals. 
To address this concern, part II begins with an overview of the development 
of the doctrine of odious debt, focusing first on the contours of the initial 
formulations of the doctrine and then turning to the details of the recent 
adaptations. In part III, the characteristics of each type of sovereign debt are 
described, and the motives of each type of creditor in making loans to sovereign 
debtors are delineated. Part IV offers an alternative proposal for constraining 
the credit available to dictators. The focal point of the analysis is sovereign 
bonds, for these investors have the strongest motives for enforcing the terms of 
the agreements governing their bonds. In particular, these agreements should 
incorporate modifications to the terms identifying the uses of proceeds from 
both the issuance of the sovereign bonds and other incurrences of indebtedness. 
These modifications will permit the sovereign bondholders to accelerate the 
amounts owed to them in the event the sovereign debtor incurs odious debts. 
 
 12. See generally Adam Feibelman, Contract, Priority, and Odious Debt, 85 N.C. L. REV. 727 
(2007) [hereinafter Feibelman, Contract]. 
 13. See generally Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of 
Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007) (examining the use of common-law principles of contract as 
defenses against the payment of odious debts); Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious 
Debts?, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (Autumn 2007) (examining the use of common-law principles 
of tort to achieve the aims of the doctrine of odious debts); Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, 
Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171 (Autumn 2007) (examining 
the use of common-law principles of lender liability as defenses against the payment of odious debts); 
A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Odious Debt Doctrine: The Missing Link in the 
Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (Summer 2007) (examining the use of fundamental principles 
of insolvency to achieve the aims of the doctrine of odious debts). 
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II 
THE NATURE OF ODIOUS DEBT 
A. Development of the Doctrine of Odious Debt 
Following the end of hostilities in the Spanish–American War of 1898, 
representatives of Spain and the United States met in Paris to negotiate the 
terms of the peace treaty between the two belligerent nations. A central point 
of contention was the repayment of loans that Spain had incurred to finance its 
operations in Cuba and for which it had pledged Cuban revenues.14 These loans 
were the result of a series of bonds the Spanish government had issued during 
the 1880s.15 The bonds, which were held by citizens of a number of nations 
including Belgium and Spain, were consolidated in 1886 when the Kingdom of 
Spain issued a royal decree pursuant to which it borrowed funds to repay the 
bonds and pledged security to guarantee repayment: 
[i]n order to satisfy the interest and the redemption of the [loans], there shall be 
consigned every year in the Budget of the Island of Cuba the necessary amounts for 
these costs . . . . The [loans] shall have the special guarantee of the receipts of the 
Customs, the Seal, and the stamp office, of the Island of Cuba, the direct and indirect 
taxes existing in the Island, or which may be established there in the future, and the 
general guarantee of the Spanish nation.16 
At the Paris Conference, the Spanish commissioner proposed that, in 
transferring sovereignty over Cuba to the United States, Spain would transfer 
“all charges and obligations of every kind . . . which the Crown of Spain . . . may 
have contracted lawfully in the exercise of the sovereignty . . . relinquished and 
transferred, and which as such constitute an integral part thereof.”17 In support 
of this proposal, the Spanish Commissioner argued, in part, that 
[i]t would be contrary to the most elementary notions of justice and inconsistent with 
the dictates of the universal conscience of mankind for a sovereign to lose all his rights 
over a territory and the inhabitants thereof, and despite this to continue to be bound 
by the obligations he had contracted exclusively for their régime and government. 
These maxims seem to be observed by all cultured nations that are unwilling to 
trample upon the eternal principles of justice . . . .18 
In response, the American commissioner argued that the debts were 
“created by the Government of Spain, for its own purposes . . . in whose 
 
 14. See ERNST H. FEILCHENFELD, PUBLIC DEBTS AND STATE SUCCESSION 329–43 (1931). 
 15. Id. at 332–34. 
 16. Id. at 332–33. 
 17. 1 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 352 (1906) (quoting the 
Spanish commissioners’ Oct. 7, 1898, counter proposal to the American commissioners’ proposal of 
October 3, 1898, in the peace negotiations at the Paris Conference, S. DOC. NO. 62, pt. 2, at 28, 33–34, 
44–45 (3d Sess. 1898)). 
 18. Id. at 353 (quoting Memorandum of American Peace Commission, S. DOC. NO. 62, pt. 2, at 41–
44 (3d Sess. 1898)). 
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creation Cuba had no voice.”19 The American commissioner further argued that 
“[f]rom no point of view can the debts . . . be considered . . . for the benefit of 
Cuba.”20 Moreover, a portion of the proceeds of the loans had been spent to 
suppress the rebellions in Cuba.21 Finally, the American commissioner asserted 
that the creditors were aware that the loans were made and that the pledge of 
Cuban revenues as security was given in the context of Spanish efforts to 
suppress the struggles of the Cuban people for independence from Spanish rule. 
As a result, these creditors “took the obvious chances of their investment on so 
precarious a security.”22 In this way, the American commissioner based the 
repudiation of the debts on three principles: (1) the debts were not incurred 
with the consent of the people of Cuba, (2) the debts did not benefit the Cuban 
people, and (3) the holders of the debts were aware of the lack of consent and 
the lack of benefit. These reasons, taken together, have often been regarded as 
an early expression of the doctrine of odious debt. 
The earliest (and only) application of these principles in the judicial context 
involved an arbitral decision to resolve a dispute between Great Britain and 
Costa Rica regarding the repayment of two loans following the fall of the 
Tinoco Regime. These loans were made pursuant to a line of credit established 
in July of 1919 at the Royal Bank of Canada for the benefit of the government 
of Costa Rica.23 In drawing upon this account, Frederico Tinoco received 
$100,000 “for expenses of representation of the Chief of State in his 
approaching trip abroad,”24 and his brother, Jose Joaquin Tinoco, received 
$100,000 “as Minister of Costa Rica to Italy, for four years’ salary and expenses 
of the Legation . . . in Italy.”25 
In seeking repayment of these loans, representatives of Great Britain 
argued that the new government of Costa Rica, as the successor to the Tinoco 
Regime, was bound to honor the loans extended by the Royal Bank of 
Canada.26 Representatives of this new government, however, denied the validity 
of the loans (as well as all other sums owed under the line of credit), citing the 
Law of Nullities, which the new government enacted to invalidate all contracts 
between the executive power and private persons made during the Tinoco 
 
 19. Id. at 358 (quoting Memorandum of American Peace Commission, S. DOC. NO. 62, pt. 2, at 48–
50 (3d Sess. 1898)). 
 20. Id. (quoting Memorandum of American Peace Commission, S. DOC. NO. 62, pt. 2, at 48–50 (3d 
Sess. 1898)). 
 21. Id. at 359. 
 22. FEILCHENFELD, supra note 14, at 341. 
 23. SABINE MICHALOWSKI, UNCONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES AND THE VALIDITY OF SOVEREIGN 
DEBT: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 38 (2007). 
 24. Tinoco (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), 1 R.I.A.A. 371, 393–94 (1923) (quoting books of the 
Government of Costa Rica entry No. 1546 F July 17, 1919). 
 25. Id. at 394 (quoting books of the Government of Costa Rica entry No. 1546 F July 17, 1919). 
 26. Id. at 377. 
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Regime on the basis that the regime was neither the de facto nor the de jure 
government of Costa Rica.27 
In reaching his decision, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Howard 
Taft, the sole arbitrator in the case, first held that under general principles of 
international law, a change of government has no effect upon the international 
obligations of the state.28 Chief Justice Taft also held that the Tinoco Regime 
was the de facto government of Costa Rica from January of 1917 through 
September of 1919, because President Tinoco governed the nation with the 
acquiescence of the people of Costa Rica, and his regime was recognized by 
several nations.29 
Yet Chief Justice Taft declined to require Costa Rica to repay the loans. In 
reaching this decision, he stated: 
It is evident from the exhibits that in the spring of 1919 the popularity of the Tinoco 
[R]égime had disappeared, and that the political and military movement to end that 
régime was gaining strength. . . . It became perfectly clear from the mob violence and 
disturbances in June and the evidences of the unpopularity of the Tinoco [R]égime, 
that it was in a critical condition . . . . 
. . . . 
The Royal Bank cannot here claim the benefit of the presumptions which might 
obtain in favor of a bank receiving a deposit in regular course of business and paying it 
out in the usual way . . . . The whole transaction here was full of irregularities. . . . The 
case of the Royal Bank depends not on the mere form of the transaction but upon the 
good faith of the bank in the payment of money for the real use of the Costa Rican 
Government under the Tinoco [R]égime. It must make out its case of actual furnishing 
of money to the government for its legitimate use. It has not done so. The bank knew 
that this money was to be used by the retiring [P]resident . . . for his personal support 
after he had taken refuge in a foreign country. . . . 
The case of the money paid to the brother . . . is much the same. . . . To pay salaries for 
four years in advance is a most unusual and absurd course of business. All the 
circumstances should have advised the Royal Bank that this second draft, too, was for 
personal and not for legitimate government purposes. It must have known that Jose 
Joaquin Tinoco in the fall of his brother’s government, which was pending, could not 
expect to represent the Costa Rican Government as its Minister to Italy for four years, 
that the reasons given for the payment of the money were a mere pretense and that it 
was only, as in the case of his brother Federico, an abstraction of the money from the 
public treasury to support a refuge abroad.30 
Many commentators regard the reasoning of this decision as incorporating 
the general principles of the doctrine of odious debt,31 as it is based on the 
assertions that the citizens of Costa Rica did not consent to the loans and they 
did not benefit from them, facts of which the lender was aware. 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 377–78. 
 29. Id. at 381. 
 30. Id. at 393–94. 
 31. See, e.g., Jeff King, Chapter One: The Doctrine of Odious Debt Under International Law: 
Definition, Evidence and Issues Concerning Application, in CISDL WORKING PAPER: ADVANCING 
THE ODIOUS DEBT DOCTRINE 41–42 (2003); MICHALOWSKI, supra note 23, at 39; Buchheit, Gulati & 
Thompson, supra note 13, at 1217–18. 
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Despite these initial developments, the only formal statements of the 
doctrine of odious debt remain those of academicians and lawyers. In 1927, 
Alexander Sack, a scholar of international law, developed a characterization of 
odious debt: 
If a despotic power incurs a debt not for the needs or in the interest of the State, but to 
strengthen its despotic regime, to repress the population that fights against it, etc., this 
debt is odious for the population of all the State. 
This debt is not an obligation for the nation; it is a regime’s debt, a personal debt of 
the power that has incurred it, consequently it falls with the fall of this power. 
The reason these “odious” debts cannot be considered to encumber the territory of 
the State, is that such debts do not fulfill one of the conditions that determine the 
legality of the debts of the State, that is: the debts of the State must be incurred and 
the funds from it employed for the needs and in the interests of the State. 
“Odious” debts, incurred and used for ends which, to the knowledge of the creditors, 
are contrary to the interests of the nation, do not compromise the latter—in the case 
that the nation succeeds in getting rid of the government which incurs them—except 
to the extent that real advantages were obtained from these debts. The creditors have 
committed a hostile act with regard to the people; they can’t therefore expect that 
nation freed from a despotic power assume the “odious” debts, which are the personal 
debts of that power. 
Even when a despotic power is replaced by another, no less despotic or any more 
responsive to the will of the people, the “odious” debts of the eliminated power are 
not any less their personal debts and are not obligations for the new power. . . .32 
This characterization of debts incurred by a dictatorial regime—to which the 
citizens of the nation do not consent and from which they do not derive 
benefits, all of which is known to the lenders at the time the debts are incurred 
as the personal debts of the dictator, to be collected from that regime rather 
than from the successor government of the nation—as “odious debts” remains 
the foundation of all discussions of the doctrine of odious debt. 
In formulating the doctrine, Professor Sack recognized that vagueness in the 
definition used to distinguish odious debts from other sovereign debts would 
provide a means for nations to default opportunistically on their debts. To avoid 
this destabilizing effect on the markets for sovereign debt, he proposed that 
claims to repudiate debts as odious be resolved in an international tribunal. 
Specifically, he proposed that 
(1) The new Government would have to prove and an international tribunal would 
have to ascertain the following: 
(a) That the needs which the former Government claimed in order to contract 
the debt in question, were odious and clearly in contradiction to the interests of 
the people of the entirety of the former State or a part thereof, and 
 
 32. ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES 
PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS 
ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 157–58 (1927), translated in 
PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING, CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD’S 
ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY 165–66 (1991). 
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(b) That the creditors, at the moment of paying out the loan, were aware of its 
odious purpose. 
(2) Upon establishment of these two points, the creditors must then prove that the 
funds for this loan were not utilized for odious purposes—harming the people of the 
entire State or part of it—but for general or specific purposes of the State which do 
not have the character of being odious.33 
Thus, according to Professor Sack, the determination of whether or not a 
debt is odious first involves a demonstration by the new government seeking 
relief from the obligation to repay a debt incurred by the prior regime that: the 
debt did not benefit the citizens of the nation (and so did not have their 
consent), and that the lender knew of the uses of the proceeds of the loan when 
they were disbursed. The lender then has an opportunity to secure repayment 
of the debt (or a portion of the debt) by showing that the proceeds (or a portion 
of them) were used to fund projects that were beneficial to the citizens. 
B. Adaptation of the Doctrine of Odious Debt 
Following this period of activity, the doctrine of odious debt remained 
fallow, seldom employed in negotiations between governments or examined in 
the academy. Then, in the spring of 2003, the United States toppled the regime 
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Estimates of the country’s foreign debt burden 
ranged from $120 billion to $130 billion,34 rising to as high as $350 billion when 
all claims incurred during the Hussein Regime were considered.35 Based on the 
size of the burden and the brutality of the regime, many commentators, 
including members of the Bush Administration, advocated that the new 
government in Iraq disavow the debts incurred during the Hussein Regime.36 In 
addition to discussions in the political sphere, these events and comments 
invigorated the debate regarding the doctrine of odious debt among 
academicians.37 
 
 33. ALEXANDER N. SACK, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ÉTATS SUR LEURS DETTES 
PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES OBLIGATIONS FINANCIÈRES [THE EFFECTS OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS 
ON THEIR PUBLIC DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 163 (1927), translated in Robert 
Howse, The Concept of Odious Debt in Public International Law 3 (U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., 
Discussion Paper No. 185, 2007), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/osgdp20074_en.pdf. 
 34. Ester Pan, Iraq: The Regime’s Debt, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 31, 2003), http:// 
www.cfr.org/publication/7796/iraq.html. 
 35. Paying for Saddam’s Sins: Should the New Iraq Honour the Financial Obligations of the Old 
Regime?, ECONOMIST, May 17, 2003, at 68. 
 36. See, e.g., Patricia Adams, Iraq’s Odious Debts 1 (Cato Institute, Policy Analysis No. 526, 2004), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-526es.html; David DeRosa, Iraq Needs a New Currency 
and Debt Relief, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS (Apr.  2003) (quoting John Snow, U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury, declaring “[c]ertainly the people of Iraq shouldn’t be saddled with those debts incurred 
through the regime of the dictator who’s now gone”); but see Iraq’s Debt: The U.S. Should Beware the 
Principle of Odious Lending, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 2003, at 20. 
 37. See generally Hanlon, supra note 7; MICHALOWSKI, supra note 23; Buchheit, Gulati & 
Thompson, supra note 13; Anupam Chander, Odious Securitization, 53 EMORY L.J. 923 (2004); 
Feibelman, Contract, supra note 12; Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each 
Other, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391 (2005) [hereinafter Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina]; Jayachandran & 
Kremer, supra note 10; Joseph Stiglitz, Odious Rulers, Odious Debts, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2003, 
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The work of scholars over the course of the past several years has 
principally been devoted to designing alternative mechanisms for achieving the 
aims of the odious debt doctrine.38 For example, several scholars have offered 
adaptations of the doctrine that shift the locus of the inquiry from the loan-by-
loan analysis inherent in Professor Sack’s formulation to an examination of the 
nature of the regime. Seema Jayachandran and Michael Kremer, for instance, 
propose that international bodies—such as the United Nations Security 
Council, as well as significant participants in the sovereign debt markets, 
including the European Union and the United States—declare that any future 
debt incurred by a particular dictator will be considered odious and therefore 
illegitimate and nontransferable to successor regimes.39 A declaration of this 
nature, they argue, would impose “loan sanctions” against the dictator by 
limiting the incentives of creditors to make loans to the dictator.40 
Similarly, Patrick Bolton and David Skeel propose that a regime be deemed 
odious if the United Nations determines that it engages in systematic 
suppression or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) determines that it 
engages in systematic looting (or both).41 The United Nations would make its 
declaration of odiousness based upon a finding of systematic suppression either 
during the time that the regime was in power or upon the emergence of a new 
government.42 In either case, the declaration would render the debts of the 
regime unenforceable.43 The IMF, they argue, “could police a regime’s looting 
by imposing conditions on access to IMF assistance as well as by invalidating 
the regime’s debt.”44 Consequently, the sources of funds available to the regime 
would be severely constrained. 
Other scholars have worked to expand the scope of the investigation to 
encompass dictatorial regimes, so that sovereign debts may be challenged as 
odious debts even during the dictator’s reign. Christoph Paulus, for example, 
identifies three conditions to the determination of a sovereign debt as odious: 
“lack of consent on the part of the people, the loan not being in the interests of 
the people, and the lender’s knowledge of the other two facts.”45 Either an 
existing court institution, such as the Dispute Settlement Body of the World 
 
at 39, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200311/stiglitz; Symposium, Odious Debts and 
State Corruption, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Summer & Autumn 2007). 
 38. A few scholars, however, have criticized the doctrine of odious debt. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & 
Eric A. Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (Summer 
2007) (arguing that, while selective application of the doctrine may be beneficial in principle, achieving 
the desired application is unlikely to be feasible in practice); Gelpern, Iraq and Argentina, supra note 
37, at 393 (arguing that sovereign debtors in dire financial straits inhabit a relatively flexible universe, 
with sufficient public, private, legal, and political resources to keep their creditors at bay). 
 39. Jayachandran and Kremer, supra note 10, at 82. 
 40. Id. at 90. 
 41. Bolton & Skeel, supra note 10, at 84–85. 
 42. Id. at 85. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Paulus, supra note 11, at 92. 
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Trade Organization, or a new adjudicative body created by the United Nations 
could be charged with enforcing this new legal principle.46 The parties permitted 
to petition the international tribunal to hear claims that a regime’s debts are 
odious would be specified through “an appropriate process which guarantees 
access to the panel in cases of ‘odious debts’ without imposing an unbearable 
control mechanism on the parties involved.”47 Upon a favorable finding, each 
sovereign debt considered in the hearing would be declared null and void, and 
the creditor would be precluded from demanding repayment on the grounds of 
unjust enrichment.48 
Proposing the application of a similar approach in a different context, Adam 
Feibelman seeks to develop a “contractual odious debt mechanism” through 
which a sovereign debtor expressly promises its creditors that it will refrain 
from incurring odious debts.49 The sovereign debtor also “promise[s] each 
creditor that it will inform subsequent creditors of the contractual arrangement 
and that it will make similar arrangements with these creditors.”50 The contract 
governing the loan will define the characteristics of an odious debt, and it will 
grant a majority, or a supermajority, of the creditors the authority to designate 
obligations of the debtor as odious in accordance with the contractual 
definition.51 If an obligation is deemed to be odious, the sovereign debtor will be 
required to repudiate it.52 
Finally, rather than proposing the development of new frameworks for 
designating regimes as odious or the inclusion of new terms in the agreements 
governing sovereign debt, other scholars have investigated the extent to which 
the aims of the doctrine of odious debt may be achieved through the application 
of principles of private (domestic) law to sovereign debts. In particular, they 
examine the extent to which common-law principles of contract, tort, and 
lender liability, as well as fundamental principles of insolvency, might provide a 
successful defense for a new government that is sued for failure to make 
payments on an odious debt incurred during the prior reign of a despot. For 
example, Lee Buchheit, Mitu Gulati, and Robert Thompson argue that 
whenever the odious debt involves a bribe, the new government should be able 
to assert (and would likely be successful in its assertion) that enforcement of the 
payment obligations related to the debt would be contrary to the public policy 
of the United States and its constituent states.53 Similarly, these scholars posit 
that, in the event the dictator stole the proceeds of the loan, the new 
government should be able to assert (and would likely be successful in its 
 
 46. Id. at 101. 
 47. Id. at 102. 
 48. Id. at 100. 
 49. Feibelman, Contract, supra note 12, at 748. 
 50. Id. at 731. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 13, at 1232–35. 
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assertion) that the lender has “unclean hands” and so is not entitled to 
payment.54 
Working within the framework of tort law, Omri Ben-Shahar and Mitu 
Gulati offer a means of apportioning the losses associated with an odious debt.55 
Specifically, they propose that upon a suit for failure to make payments on an 
odious debt, the sovereign debtor should be entitled to assert a defense of 
contributory negligence.56 To the extent the new government is able to show 
that the lender was at fault, the portion of the debt that was not used for the 
benefit of the country’s citizens would be discharged. For example, if the 
proceeds of the loan were deposited into a personal account of the dictator, 
then the entire debt would be discharged. If only a portion of the proceeds of 
the loan was used to pay a bribe to the dictator, then only that portion of the 
debt would be discharged. Professor Ben-Shahar and Professor Gulati note that 
they are, in effect, proposing a comparative-fault scheme for odious debts—one 
that is applicable not only to disputes between the new government and each of 
its creditors, but also to disputes among the creditors because those creditors 
who are less at fault would be able to secure greater payments on the debts 
owed to them.57 
To address disputes among creditors, Professor Feibelman draws upon the 
doctrines of lender liability, particularly equitable subornation and fraudulent 
transfer.58 He argues that the creditors of a sovereign debtor should be able to 
employ these doctrines to subordinate or avoid odious debts that the sovereign 
owes to other creditors pursuant to state law in federal district courts or state 
courts in the United States.59 By providing creditors with a means to reduce (or 
to eliminate) the likelihood that a creditor acting opportunistically or 
fraudulently will be entitled to payment in respect of its debt, these doctrines 
provide incentives for creditors to monitor one another, particularly with 
respect to the incurrence of odious debts.60 
Mechele Dickerson relies upon fundamental principles of insolvency to 
achieve the aims of the doctrine of odious debt. In particular, she argues that 
the core “business” of a new government is to “protect the safety and provide 
for the general welfare of its citizens.”61 Thus, it is consistent with general 
insolvency principles to allow a new government, encumbered with enormous 
debts that provided little (or no) benefits to the citizens of the country, to 
 
 54. Id. at 1235–37. 
 55. See generally Ben-Shahar & Gulati, supra note 13. 
 56. Id. at 50. 
 57. Id. at 65. 
 58. See generally Feibelman, supra note 13. 
 59. Id. at 179 (noting that asserting these doctrines under bankruptcy law is unavailable because 
sovereigns cannot file for bankruptcy under U.S. bankruptcy law). 
 60. Id. at 189. 
 61. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 72. 
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repudiate those debts if repaying them would render the government 
functionally insolvent and unable to perform its critical functions.62 
Over the course of the more than one hundred years during which the 
doctrine of odious debt was initially developed and then recently adapted, the 
nature of international lending has changed dramatically. At the time of the 
Spanish–American War of 1898 and the Tinoco Arbitration in 1923, and 
continuing until the middle of the 1940s, sovereign debtors borrowed funds 
almost exclusively from investors who purchased sovereign bonds.63 Beginning 
in the Cold War, sovereign debtors procured loans from other governments64 as 
well as from the international financial institutions, notably the World Bank.65 
During the 1970s, sovereign debtors borrowed funds from commercial banks.66 
These loans were securitized and converted into bonds (known as Brady bonds) 
during the 1990s.67 As a result of these transitions—from bonds to bilateral loans 
and multilateral loans, to commercial-bank loans, and then again to bonds—as 
well as the continuing role of private lenders, international financial institutions, 
and governments in providing credit to sovereigns, the international financial 
architecture is comprised of distinct creditors with diverse interests.68  
To be sure, the extent of involvement of any of these creditors in lending to 
sovereigns fluctuates over time. In addition, the particular mix of debt—
sovereign bonds, commercial-bank loans, multilateral loans from the 
international financial institutions, and bilateral loans from other 
governments—varies from sovereign debtor to sovereign debtor. Nonetheless, 
each of these creditors and each of these types of debt are present in the 
international financial architecture. An analysis of the odious debt doctrine, as 
well as of the recent adaptations of the doctrine, then, requires an 
understanding of the nature of the salient features of each type of sovereign 
debt. 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Vinod K. Aggarwal, The Evolution of Debt Crisis: Origins, Management and Policy Lessons, in 
SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS, CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING 11, 13 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte 
Granville eds., 2003); Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards? The Role of 
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1051–53 (2004). 
 64. Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 87 (Summer 2007) 
[hereinafter Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt]. 
 65. Aggarwal, supra note 63, at 14. 
 66. James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and New: The Legal Intellectual History of an Idea, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 202–03 (Autumn 2007). 
 67. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1067. 
 68. Id. at 1070–71; Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings, 53 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1115–16 (2004). 
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III 
THE ELEMENTS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT 
A. Bilateral Loans 
As tensions during the Cold War escalated, the government of the United 
States, as well as the government of the Soviet Union, began to provide 
financing to governments to advance strategic objectives. These new programs 
had a variety of goals ranging from the improvement of military capabilities to 
economic development to humanitarian assistance.69 The enactment of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,70 together with the founding of the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID),71 comprised a comprehensive foreign-
assistance program. Through this program, Congress has authorized myriad 
foreign loan initiatives related to the spread of democracy, the growth of 
exports, the reduction of poverty, and the eradication of disease. 
The primary form of assistance from the United States was, and remains, 
loans.72 Yet, in many instances, the government does not expect that the loans 
will be repaid. Rather than enforcing the payment provisions, a portion (or all) 
of the loans is often forgiven or converted to a grant.73 
In the event the bilateral loans must be restructured, the work is conducted 
through the Paris Club, an informal group of nineteen creditor governments 
from the major industrialized countries.74 Representatives of these countries 
meet monthly in Paris to assist sovereign debtors in restructuring their debts.75 
Agreements between the governmental lenders and the sovereign debtors are 
typically reached quickly and inexpensively because the governments are 
willing to make concessions based on geopolitical, rather than financial, 
considerations.76 
These arrangements, of course, arise from the nature of bilateral loans. 
These types of loans are, in essence, political accommodations rather than 
economic transactions. In making a loan to an ally, the United States (like all 
creditor countries) is concerned with achieving its tactical goals—such as 
 
 69. Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, supra note 64, at 94. 
 70. Act for International Development of 1961 (Foreign Assistance Act of 1961), Pub. L. No. 87-
195, § 503, 75 Stat. 424, 435 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2311). 
 71. See About USAID, USAID, http://www.usaid/gov/about_usaid/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2010). 
 72. Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, supra note 64, at 95. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See THE PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2010). 
 75. Paris Club Meetings, THE PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/ 
fonctionnement-du-club/reunions (last visited Dec. 2, 2010). 
 76. A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 
EMORY L.J. 997, 1008–09 (2006). 
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influencing the ally’s policies—not with generating additional revenues for the 
public fisc. Consequently, loans are often made to dictatorships.77 
B. Multilateral Loans 
The IMF, with nearly two hundred members, was established in 194578 to 
promote international monetary cooperation and exchange stability, to foster 
economic growth, and to provide temporary financial assistance to countries 
that are experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties.79 The principal means by 
which the IMF works to achieve these goals is multilateral loans,80 financed with 
funds provided by its members.81 The terms and conditions of these loans, which 
typically include stipulations regarding specific economic policies to be 
implemented,82 are the subject of negotiation between the IMF and the member 
country requesting the loan.83 
Over the course of the half-century since its creation, and in response to 
changes in the international financial architecture, the IMF has altered its 
rationale for making loans to sovereigns.84 Rather than assisting countries in 
resolving temporary difficulties in their current account payments, the efforts of 
the IMF have shifted to promoting economic development and managing 
restructurings of sovereign debt.85 Specifically, IMF loans are now designed (1) 
to assist countries in adjusting to shocks caused by a variety of events, including 
changes in the terms of trade and national disasters, as a means of avoiding 
severe economic disruptions and costly defaults on sovereign debts, (2) to 
provide a catalyst for other lenders, particularly commercial banks and 
investors, to extend credit to countries experiencing disruptions and 
restructurings, and (3) to prevent capital account crises.86 
In addition to these concerns for economic development, multilateral loans 
often entail political considerations. For example, Strom Thacker has 
demonstrated that the United States, which controls the largest portion of the 
 
 77. Indeed, Professor Choi and Professor Posner suggest that cooperation with dictatorships is 
more common than sanctioning them. Choi & Posner, supra note 38, at 33. 
 78. The IMF at a Glance, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
exr/facts/glance.htm [hereinafter IMF at a Glance]. 
 79. ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND art. I–Purposes, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/. 
 80. Yilmaz Akyűz, Rectifying Capital Market Imperfections: The Continuing Rational for 
Multilateral Lending, in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE: RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 486, 486 
(Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceiçáo eds., 2006). 
 81. IMF at a Glance, supra note 78. 
 82. Lending by the IMF, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/external/about/lending.htm 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Lending by the IMF]. 
 83. Factsheet: IMF Lending, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/exr/facts/howlend.htm. 
 84. Lending by the IMF, supra note 82. 
 85. Akyűz, supra note 80, at 492–94. 
 86. Lending by the IMF, supra note 82. 
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voting power in the IMF,87 favors granting loans to countries that serve as allies, 
particularly in their respective voting patterns on matters presented in the 
United Nations General Assembly.88 Axel Dreher and Nathan Jensen have 
shown that loans made to countries voting with the United States in the United 
Nations General Assembly have fewer conditions than those made to countries 
that are not allied with the United States in this way.89 
Multilateral loans thus share important characteristics with bilateral loans. 
They are designed to achieve specific objectives—protecting and strengthening 
the international financial architecture—not to earn profits for the IMF. 
Decisions to extend credit as well as determinations of the applicable 
prerequisites for receiving credit are influenced by efforts to advance political 
aims. Finally, restructurings of these loans involve a dialogue between the IMF 
and the relevant sovereign debtor, and so are seldom time consuming or costly. 
C. Private Loans 
1.  Commercial Loans 
Commercial banks make loans to sovereigns through lending syndicates.90 
Each syndicate is organized by a large, international commercial bank that 
serves as the manager of the syndicate.91 The managing bank advises the 
sovereign of market conditions, principally the terms on which it expects to be 
able to obtain commitments from a sufficient number of commercial banks to 
satisfy the sovereign’s borrowing needs.92 The manager also negotiates, on 
behalf of the syndicate, the terms of the loan agreement with the sovereign.93 To 
complete the syndication process, the managing bank prepares, in conjunction 
with the sovereign, an information memorandum describing the sovereign’s 
financial condition and the loan terms.94 The manager then secures the 
commitments of the banks participating in the syndicate, and it arranges for the 
funds to be disbursed to the sovereign debtor.95 
Restructurings of commercial loans are accomplished through the London 
Club, a collection of informal arrangements including the use of bank advisory 
 
 87. Strom C. Thacker, The High Politics of IMF Lending, 52 WORLD POL. 38, 41 (1999). 
 88. Id. at 67–69. 
 89. Axel Dreher & Nathan M. Jensen, Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions, 50 J.L. & ECON. 105, 121 (2007). 
 90. JOHN D. FINNERTY & DOUGLAS R. EMERY, DEBT MANAGEMENT: A PRACTITIONER’S 
GUIDE 31–32 (2001). 
 91. Leo Clarke & Stanley F. Farrar, Rights and Duties of Managing and Agent Banks in Syndicated 
Loans to Government Borrowers, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 229, 229 (1982). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 233. See also International Banking Survey, ECONOMIST, Mar. 20, 1982. 
 94. Clarke & Farrar, supra note 91, at 233. 
 95. Id. at 244–45. 
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committees and standard processes for negotiating with sovereign debtors.96 The 
terms of each restructuring are, in large measure, influenced by the IMF, which 
requires the commercial banks in the lending syndicate to make new loans to 
the sovereign debtor as a condition to the extension of multilateral credit.97 In 
many instances, the U.S. government also plays a significant role in the 
negotiations, counseling (and pressuring) both members of the bank advisory 
committees and representatives of the sovereign debtor.98 
Although the work of the London Club proceeds slowly—requiring, in some 
cases, years to complete the restructuring of a sovereign debtor’s commercial 
loans—the informal processes tend to be effective.99 Commercial banks are 
typically reluctant to disavow the work of the London Club by declaring a 
default and accelerating their loans because there are few advantages and 
significant disadvantages. Upon the declaration of a default on a loan in its 
portfolio, a commercial bank is required, pursuant to applicable regulations, to 
increase its loan-loss reserves or write off a portion of the loan.100 Both of these 
actions diminish the commercial bank’s financial condition. Moreover, rejection 
of a restructuring proposed through the London Club would jeopardize, for the 
commercial bank serving as the manager of the lending syndicate, important 
business relationships with the sovereign debtor101 and, for small, regional 
commercial banks participating in the lending syndicate, vital banking 
relationships with the managing bank.102 
Unlike bilateral loans and multilateral loans, commercial loans are, to a 
significant degree, subject to market forces. Commercial banks must operate 
profitably to remain in business. In determining whether to enforce the right to 
repayment of a loan against a sovereign debtor or to accept the partial payment 
to be made as part of a proposed restructuring of the loan, commercial banks 
weigh the likely impact of each course of action on revenues and expenses. Due 
to the high regulatory costs and the impairment of crucial relationships caused 
by the declaration of an event of default, commercial banks acquiesce to the 
demands of the London Club. 
 
 96. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1055–63; Daniel McGovern, Different Market Windows 
on Sovereign Debt: Private-Sector Credit from the 1980s to the Present, in SOVEREIGN DEBT: ORIGINS, 
CRISES AND RESTRUCTURING 69, 82–83 (Vinod K. Aggarwal & Brigitte Granville eds., 2003). 
 97. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1061–62. The extension of multilateral credit, of course, is 
necessary for the sovereign to resolve the financial crisis giving rise to the restructuring and to resume 
payments on its debts. 
 98. See Lee C. Buchheit, Sovereign Debt: A Change of Hat, INT’L FIN. L. REV., June 1990, at 12 
(describing the conflicting roles of the U.S. government in restructurings of sovereign commercial 
loans). 
 99. McGovern, supra note 96, at 82–83. 
 100. Clarke & Farrar, supra note 91, at 232. 
 101. Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1058–59. 
 102. See id. at 1060–61. 
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2. Sovereign Bonds 
Sovereign bonds are sold in the capital markets, including the domestic 
market in the United States and the international Eurobond market.103 The 
investors purchasing an issue of sovereign bonds may be citizens of the issuer or 
other countries, as well as financial institutions or single individuals.104 They 
include commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds, mutual funds, and purchasers in the retail sector.105 
These diverse purchasers differ in their investment strategies, in the 
regulations to which they are subject, and in the nature of their relationships 
with sovereign debtors.106 Furthermore, they purchase their sovereign bonds at 
different prices, as bonds in the secondary market often trade at deep discounts 
to their face values.107 Vulture funds, notably, trade in distressed debt, including 
sovereign bonds. These investors seek short-term gains by purchasing the debt 
of troubled issuers for pennies on the dollar and then, once a violation of the 
terms of the bonds occurs, seek to enforce their rights (including, when 
applicable, the right to the repayment of the full value of the debt) through 
litigation.108 
Restructurings of sovereign bonds take place in the capital markets through 
exchange offers.109 In these transactions, sovereign debtors propose to replace 
existing bonds with alternative bonds that reschedule or reduce the payments 
owed under the original bonds.110 Rather than negotiating directly with the 
creditors, or with an advisory committee following standard processes, 
sovereign debtors consult with groups of financial institutions holding large 
positions in the bonds, and they also meet individually with these investors.111 
 
 103. Michael G. Kollo, Underwriter Competition and Gross Spreads in the Eurobond Market 9 (Eur. 
Cent. Bank, Working Paper Series No. 550, 2005), available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ 
ecbwp550.pdf. See also INT’L MONETARY FUND, ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKET FOR 
FIRST-TIME SOVEREIGN ISSUERS 16, 20 (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/icm/2003/eng/ 
111703.pdf (describing factors for consideration in selection of market for issuance of sovereign bonds). 
 104. McGovern, supra note 96, at 77. 
 105. Id. See also Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap, INT’L FIN. L. REV., 
Dec. 2000, at 17, 18 [hereinafter Buchheit, Bond Trap] (describing diversity among holders of 
Ecuador’s Brady bonds); Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, Uruguay’s Innovations, 2004 J. INT’L 
BUS. L. REV. 28, 28 [hereinafter Buchheit, Innovations] (noting fragmented and dispersed holders of 
sovereign bonds). 
 106. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 63, at 1071–74. 
 107. See Buchheit, Bond Trap, supra note 105, at 18 (noting discounts in secondary markets for 
Ecuador’s Brady bonds). 
 108. For a discussion of the role of vulture funds in sovereign debt restructurings, see Fisch & 
Gentile, supra note 63, at 1071–72, 1088–90. 
 109. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48 UCLA. L. 
REV. 59, 60 (2000). 
 110. Id. at 60, 62–64. 
 111. See, e.g., Buchheit, Bond Trap, supra note 105, at 18 (describing the restructuring process for 
Ecuador’s Brady bonds); Buchheit, Innovations, supra note 105, at 28–29 (describing the restructuring 
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FIN. L. REV., Apr. 2005, at 19, 20–21 [hereinafter, Gelpern, Bond Markets] (describing the restructuring 
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This consultative process is designed to allow sovereign debtors to determine 
the restructuring terms that are likely to be acceptable to all (or nearly all) 
investors.112 
The diversity of investors and the heterogeneity of their interests make this 
task impossibly difficult.113 Additionally, some investors, namely vulture funds, 
pursue a strategy of rejecting exchange offers and seeking preferential 
treatment in court. This holdout litigation, while often beneficial for the vulture 
funds, disrupts the restructuring process, causing delays and inflicting losses on 
the sovereign debtor and the other creditors.114 Efforts to preclude, or constrain, 
these types of suits against sovereign debtors115 have not been entirely 
successful,116 and this litigation remains a persistent characteristic of 
restructurings of sovereign bonds. 
IV 
LIMITING ODIOUS CREDIT 
Recent efforts to adapt the doctrine of odious debt to shift the onus of 
limiting the harms a dictator inflicts on the citizenry from new governments to 
creditors are an essential component of the modern legal history of sovereign 
debt. Recognizing the reluctance of new governments to employ the doctrine to 
repudiate debts incurred by despots, these proposals seek to raise the costs of 
extending credit to dictators and thereby reduce incentives to lend. Yet, many 
creditors have motivations other than profit in making loans to sovereigns and 
so are unlikely to alter their behavior upon the implementation of these plans. 
And, some of the creditors that are motivated by financial gain are likely to find 
the profitable course of action to be to accept short-term losses in order to 
secure long-term gains. 
In making bilateral loans, the U.S. government (like other creditor 
governments) seeks to advance its strategic objectives, and so it agrees to 
restructure its loans to sovereigns to achieve tactical goals. Similarly, the IMF, 
in making and in agreeing to restructure multilateral loans, seeks to achieve 
specific objectives regarding the soundness of the international financial 
architecture and, in many instances, to advance partisan interests. Moreover, 
commercial banks, although subject to market forces in making loans to 
 
 112. Buchheit, Innovations, supra note 105, at 29 (noting the purpose of consultations in the 
restructuring process for Uruguay’s bonds). 
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sovereigns, maximize revenues and minimize expenses by agreeing to 
restructuring terms that reflect political pressures and impulses to protect 
valuable relationships. 
Investors, however, base their decisions to purchase and to agree to 
restructure sovereign bonds upon financial considerations. These calculations 
include the profit to be earned by purchasing sovereign bonds in the secondary 
market for a fraction of their face values and enforcing payment of the entire 
amount owed on the bonds in court. This inclination of vulture funds to pursue 
opportunistic litigation may be harnessed to limit the credit available to 
dictators. 
A. Uses of Proceeds and Covenants 
To sell bonds in the capital markets, sovereigns must provide investors with 
extensive information regarding their financial condition and the terms of the 
bonds. As Lee Buchheit has noted, 
Borrowers face a cruel choice: tell or pay. The finest pricing terms for a debt 
obligation are usually available only for instruments that have a significant degree of 
liquidity ([i.e.,] instruments that can be readily sold or resold to a broad range of 
investors). But the securities laws of most jurisdictions say that a borrower which 
issues its debt instruments to a broad range of investors should disclose a good deal of 
information about itself, its business and its financial condition to the prospective 
purchasers of those instruments. Thus, a disclosure-averse borrower may be consigned 
to raising funds through commercial bank loans . . . ; borrowings that typically 
command some premium in terms of pricing in comparison with publicly-issued debt 
instruments.117 
In describing the market practice regarding issuances of sovereign bonds, 
Mr. Buchheit states that sovereigns “generally provide . . . information about 
their country, its history and political situation, foreign relations, economic and 
financial information including balance of payments, balance of trade and 
exchange rate policies, and external debt service statistics.”118 With respect to 
the agreements governing the bonds, Stephen Choi and Professor Gulati 
examined the information provided by ten sovereigns issuing bonds from 1985 
to 2005.119 They found that an explicit change in the actual contract language 
relating to the individual rights of holders of the bonds during a restructuring of 
the bonds was disclosed prominently, and continued to be disclosed 
prominently almost two years after the change in terms became widely known 
in the market, by all but one of the sovereigns.120 
Moreover, sovereigns issuing bonds in the U.S. market must comply with 
the disclosure requirements of Schedule B to the Securities Act of 1933.121 These 
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 121. 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2009). 
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requirements include information regarding the “specific purposes in detail and 
the approximate amounts to be devoted to such purposes, so far as 
determinable, for which the security to be offered is to supply funds . . . .”122 
Rather than merely identifying the purposes for which the proceeds are to 
be used, sovereign debtors could promise to apply the funds in the manner 
specified. In effect, the description in the offering document for the bonds 
would be repeated as a covenant in the agreement governing the bonds. So, if 
the disclosed uses of the proceeds were to build hospitals and schools in rural 
areas, then the governing agreement would contain a covenant that the 
sovereign debtor will use the proceeds of the bonds to build hospitals and 
schools in rural areas.123 In addition to promising to use the sale proceeds in a 
specified manner, sovereign debtors could also covenant to use the proceeds 
from all subsequent incurrences of debt for similar purposes that benefit the 
citizenry.124 
Incorporating a covenant regarding the uses of the proceeds from an 
issuance of sovereign bonds into the agreement governing the bonds would 
provide investors with a way to restrict the ability of dictators to use borrowed 
funds for purposes that have deleterious effects on the citizenry.125 Were a 
sovereign debtor to breach the covenant, the investors would have the right to 
accelerate the amount owed on the bonds, including the principal, making the 
debt due immediately, rather than on the maturity date of the bonds.126 The 
exigencies of immediate repayment would severely constrain the funds 
available to the dictator. 
Investors are likely to be able to obtain information regarding covenant 
breaches. Funds borrowed to finance projects that are beneficial for the 
citizenry typically involve large-scale public works, such as infrastructure 
development through the construction of power plants, waterways, sewage 
plants, and roads, and community development through building hospitals and 
schools. The results of these types of projects—utilities, dams and reservoirs, 
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document for an issue of sovereign bonds contains a description of the amounts to be paid (principal 
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and means described in the offering document. 
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safety and providing for the general welfare of its citizens. Dickerson, supra note 13, at 72. This 
proposed covenant, then, may be viewed as analogous to business continuation covenants in 
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 125. Remedies for violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws are limited to 
damages. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: ESSENTIALS 102–03 
(2008). 
 126. For a description of the workings of acceleration clauses in agreements governing sovereign 
bonds, see Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Soveriegn Bonds and the Collective Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 
1317, 1330–32 (2002). 
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waste treatment facilities, highways, and sizable buildings—are easily observed 
by investors. 
Moreover, vulture funds, like all hedge funds, regularly engage specialist 
research firms to provide them with detailed information regarding their 
investments.127 Each consultant employed by these firms has extensive 
experience in the industry with respect to which research services are provided, 
as well as access to information that is not widely available in the capital 
markets. Upon the adoption of use-of-proceeds covenants in agreements 
governing sovereign bonds, specialist research firms can be expected to expand 
the areas and events they cover to encompass the progress on, and completion 
of, the public-works projects promised to be funded with the proceeds from 
issuances of sovereign bonds.128 Similarly, the credit rating agencies are likely to 
expand their analyses of the creditworthiness of sovereign debtors to include, 
for each country, a review of compliance with the use-of-proceeds covenants in 
the agreements governing its sovereign bonds.129 Finally, as Professor Gulati and 
George Triantis have explained, the IMF serves as a delegated monitor in the 
sovereign debt context, bearing responsibility for scrutinizing the actions of 
sovereign debtors.130 This scrutiny includes monitoring “economic performance, 
debt burdens and servicing strategies, and macro economic policies. Its staff 
conducts site visits, prepares country reports, and provides expert assistance to 
help members address debt servicing or macro economic challenges.”131 
Through this work, the IMF will promptly uncover evidence of failures to 
comply with use-of-proceeds covenants, and it can be expected to share this 
information with investors.  
Investors are likely to favor the incorporation of covenants regarding uses of 
proceeds into agreements governing sovereign bonds. For vulture funds, these 
covenants would provide an additional opportunity to pursue their strategy of 
seeking, through litigation, preferential treatment for repayment of sovereign 
bonds purchased in the secondary market. Other investors are also likely to 
value the protection the covenants would provide against efforts of sovereign 
debtors to restructure their bonds on advantageous terms. For example, Mr. 
Buchheit and Professor Gulati describe the conduct of President Correa as: 
[l]acking a financial justification for demanding concessions from the country’s 
creditors, the Correa administration decided that it would seek a legal pretext for its 
hostile debt policy. The slogans for this were lying conveniently at hand courtesy of 
 
 127. See Laurie P. Cohen, Seeking an Edge, Big Investors Turn to Network of Informants, WALL ST. 
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 130. Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus Corporate Debt, 75 
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the academic debate about the early twentieth century doctrine of odious sovereign 
debts . . . . 
Shortly after taking office in 2006, Correa appointed a Commission of Integral Audit 
of Public Credit and ordered it to examine Ecuador’s foreign debts. That Commission, 
composed principally of local and foreign activists for third-world debt cancellation, 
duly reported its finding that virtually all of Ecuador’s external debt stock was fatally 
tainted by illegality and illegitimacy.132 
If the agreements governing Ecuador’s sovereign bonds had contained use-of-
proceeds covenants, these actions would have resulted in restructuring terms 
that were disadvantageous to the country, as claims that its debt negotiators 
were wicked and corrupt would have provided a basis for investors to assert 
claims of breach of covenant, which would have strengthened their negotiating 
position. Finally, some investors may view the covenants as an effective means 
of limiting the credit available to dictators, and they may value those 
constraints. In describing the significant degree of debt relief granted to heavily 
indebted sovereigns, Mr. Buchheit and Professor Gulati note that 
[n]o one will ever be able to determine how much of the relief granted to these 
countries was attributable to the creditors’ own sense of culpability for having lent 
money, or at least so much money, in the first place. But this was surely an element in 
the deals cut for certain countries such as Iraq in 2004.133 
Sovereign debtors are unlikely to resist efforts to incorporate covenants 
regarding uses of proceeds into agreements governing sovereign bonds. Indeed, 
they can be expected to support these efforts. Michael Bradley, James Cox, and 
Professor Gulati “find that sovereign bond pricing is sensitive to changes in 
legal risk posed by . . . bond covenants.”134 Thus, the more protections the 
agreement governing the bonds provides to investors, the lower the interest rate 
investors demand to purchase the bonds (because the bonds are subject to less 
risk). By including a use-of-proceeds covenant in the agreement governing an 
issue of its bonds, then, a sovereign debtor can obtain a lower interest rate on 
the bonds, thereby reducing the cost of the financing. The reduction in 
financing costs provides strong incentives to incorporate covenants regarding 
uses of proceeds into agreements governing sovereign bonds. 
B. Covenants and Capital Markets 
The terms of any covenant regarding the use of the proceeds from any 
issuance of sovereign bonds will be familiar to investors and sovereign debtors. 
Indeed, these terms will be drawn from the capital markets. In preparing a 
covenant for inclusion in the agreement governing an issue of sovereign bonds, 
a sovereign debtor will review the offering documents used to market issuances 
of the sovereign debtor’s bonds in the past, as well as the offering documents 
for issuances of bonds of similar countries with comparable financing needs. 
 
 132. Buchheit & Gulati, Coroner’s Inquest, supra note 2, at 23. 
 133. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Odious Debts and Nation-Building: When the Incubus 
Departs, 60 ME. L. REV. 477, 485 (2008). 
 134. Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 116, at 302. 
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The sovereign debtor will also review the planned uses for the funds to be 
obtained upon issuance of the bonds. As a consequence of this process, the 
description of the uses of the proceeds in the offering document and the related 
terms of the use-of-proceeds covenant in the governing agreement135 will be 
both in a standard form and tailored to reflect the intentions of the sovereign 
debtor.136 Moreover, by incorporating the description of the uses of the proceeds 
in the offering document into a covenant made in the agreement governing the 
bonds, the sovereign debtor grants investors the right to accelerate the amount 
owed on the bonds in the event the proceeds are not used as promised in the 
covenant (and described in the offering document). 
As a result, adapting existing disclosure requirements and market practices 
to incorporate a covenant regarding the use of proceeds from an issuance of 
sovereign bonds into the agreement governing the bonds is unlikely to disrupt 
the capital markets. Rather than introducing new adjudicative procedures and 
seeking to develop new contractual mechanisms, this approach uses existing 
terms and exploits extant incentives toward litigation to provide a means of 
limiting the credit available to dictators.  
This approach, however, is not without limitations. Although both investors 
and sovereign debtors have strong incentives to include covenants limiting the 
uses of the proceeds from issuances of sovereign bonds in the agreements 
governing the bonds, we cannot be sure that the agreements will be modified in 
this way. Agreements governing sovereign bonds can be characterized as highly 
standardized, and they are generally very difficult to modify, even in the face of 
sustained pressure from governmental officials.137 
Moreover, even if agreements governing sovereign bonds were modified to 
include use-of-proceeds covenants, they would serve to constrain only sovereign 
debtors that issue bonds. Countries that obtain their external financing (or even 
a substantial portion of their external financing) through bilateral loans and 
multilateral loans will not be subject to pressures from investors. Indeed, even 
countries that borrow extensively from other private creditors, like commercial 
banks, will not be severely constrained in using the proceeds of the loans in 
ways that do not benefit the citizenry. 
Furthermore, even sovereigns that obtain all (or a substantial portion of) 
their external financing through issuances of bonds governed by agreements 
containing covenants limiting the uses of the proceeds from the bonds may be 
able to finance undertakings that are detrimental to their citizens. Money, of 
course, is fungible. So, if funds from the issuance of the bonds cannot be used in 
ways that are detrimental to the interests of the country’s citizens, tax revenues 
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will be available for these purposes. Good reasons exist, however, to conclude 
that opportunities to engage in this type of substitution may be limited.138 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The exploration—by governmental officials, participants in the capital 
markets, lawyers, and academicians—of the doctrine of odious debt remains an 
enduring hallmark of the modern legal history of sovereign debt. In seeking to 
adapt the odious debt doctrine to serve as a means of reducing the incentives of 
creditors to make loans to dictators, this work has embraced myriad 
approaches. One method of analysis shifts the focus of the inquiry from 
individual extensions of credit to entire regimes, proposing to designate an 
international adjudicative forum as responsible for identifying despots against 
whom debts will not be enforced. Another analytical approach extends the time 
of the inquiry from the period following the overthrow of the dictator to include 
the period of his reign, relying on an international tribunal or the enforcement 
of new terms in commercial bank loans to identify the debts that sovereign 
debtors must repudiate. A final method of analysis retains the focus on the 
debts of the sovereign in the aftermath of the dictatorial regime that is inherent 
in the odious debt doctrine and proposes to use common-law principles of 
contract, tort, and lender liability—as well as fundamental principles of 
insolvency—to craft successful defenses against claims for payment upon 
repudiation of the debts incurred by the despot. As a practical matter, each of 
these proposed adaptations may prove difficult to implement. 
A more effective approach may be to incorporate existing disclosure 
requirements and market practices into the terms of the agreements governing 
sovereign bonds. Adopting a covenant regarding the use of the proceeds from 
an issuance of bonds and subsequent incurrences of debt would provide 
investors with a direct means—by accelerating the amount owed on the bonds 
upon a breach of the covenant—of limiting the credit available to dictators. This 
approach, moreover, is likely to be favored by both investors and sovereign 
debtors. Finally, in providing only greater enforcement rights for terms that are 
part of all issuances of sovereign bonds, this approach is unlikely to disrupt the 
capital markets. 
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